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the then exIsting gold parity.After the election,rumors spread that the
new administration planned to devalue,that Roosevelt had beenpet- suaded by George Warrento follow a policy of altering the goldcontent of the dollar asa means of "reflating" prices. Therumors became par-
ticularly widespread in early1933 and gained credence whenRoosevelt refused to deny them. Theeffect of the tumors and the failureto deny them was that, for the firsttime in the course of thecontraction, the internal drain in part tookthe form of a demand forgold coin and
certificates thereby reinforcing theexternal drain arising fromspeculative accumulation of foreign exchange.
The rumors about goldwere only one part of the generaluncertainty during the interregnumabout future financial andeconomic policy. Under
ordinary circumstances, itwould have been doubtfulthat such rumors and such uncertainty couldbe a major factoraccounting for so dramatic and widespreada financial panic. But thesewere not ordinary circum- stances. The uncertaintycame after more than threeyears of severe economic contraction and aftermore than two years of bankingdifficulties in which onewave of bank failures had followedanother and had left the banking systemin a peculiarly vulnerableposition. The FederalRscre itself participated inthe general atmosphereof panic. Once thepanic started, it fed on itself.
2. Factors Accountingfor Changes in theStock of Money
The factorsaccounting for changes in thestock of money duringthe four years from 1929 to 1933are strikingly different fromthose in the other periods we haveexamined. Generally,the pattern forhigh-powered money has impressed itselfmost strongly on the totalstock of money, the behayior of the twodeposit ratios servingmainly to alter the tiltof the money stock relative to thetilt of high-posrerdmoney. That relation holds in Chart 31only for the periodup tO October 1930. theonset of the first banking crisis.Thereafter, the twodeposit ratios takecommand. High-powered moneymoves in a directionopposite to that of thetotal stock of money, andnot even most of itsshort-termmovements leave an impress on the stock ofmoney.
From August 1929to March 1933as a whole, the changein high- powered money alonewould have produceda rise of 17per cent in. the stock of money. Thechange in thedeposstcurrencyratio alone would
Frank B. Freidel,Franklin DelanoRoosevelt, Vol. 3,The TriumphBoto0 Little Brown, 1956,p. 351Rxey Smith andNorman BcaSiey CarterG105, New York, Longmans Green1939. pp. 32l-333When Rooseveltauthjjzd to reduce the goldcontent of the dollar underauthority of theThomas amendment to the .Agric,lturl



































have produced a decline of 37 per cent; the changein the deposit-reserve
ratio, a decline of 20 per cent:interaction between the two ratios, a rise
of 10 per cent; these three converted thel714 per cent rise that high-
powered money would have produced into a 35 per cerndecline in the
stock of money.46 For a inUre detailed examinationof these changes, we
The trough of the money stock was reached inAprilI 933. Although the
percentage decline from Aug. 1929 so Apr. 1933is only slightly larger than from
Aug. 1929 to Mar. 1933 (35.7 rather than 35.2 percent), the percentage changes
in the money stock each determinant would haveproduced if it alone had changed
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consider separately each of the periods distinguishedin the precdn
section and marked off on our charts.
THE STOCK MARKET CRASH, OCTOtIER 1929
Before the stock market crash, all three determinantsof the money stock,
and hence also the money stock itself, had beenroughly constant. The
constancy in high-powered money reflecteda rough constancy in eac1 of
the categories into which we have dividedthe correspondine assets of
the monetary authorities: the gold stock,Federal Reserve private claims,
and other physical assets and flat of themonetary authorities (see Chart
32B) However, the constancy of FederalReserve f)rivate claims concea!s
a not uninteresting detail, brought out by Chart 33.which shows tie
components of Federal Reserve credit outstanding.The total was roughly
constant because a decline in bills discountedwas offset by a rise in hills
bought. The reason for the divergentmovements was the siniultaneous
rise in August 1929 of the NewYork Reserve Bank's discountrate fioj 5 to 6 per cent and the declineof its buying rate on bills (bankers'ac- ceptances) from 5% to 5% percent. We analyzed the reason for these
apparently inconsistentmovements in the preceding chaptersection 4) Their effect was to make it profitablefor banks to get funds fromthe Reserve System by creatingacceptances and selling them to the Reserve
Banks rather than by increasingtheir own indebtedness
When the crash came, therewere widespread attempts by holdersof securities to liquidate them saidby banks and other lendersoutside New York to reduce their loans.As in all such cases, theposition of the collec- tion of participants is differentfrom that of anyone Participant. Long- term securities cannot, on net, beliquidated in a short intervalbut only
the ooler shown in the text. Thereason is that the return flow ofcurreçy alter th bankin5 holiday reduced high-powered
money substantially and alsoraised the depcs -:irrery ratio from Mar.to Apr. 1933. Thn,snierical values of thecontributions of the determinantsduring the con- tractioii dated as ending in Mar. andin Apr. 1933, follow.
Clcsngin Money Stock That Would HaveBeen Produced liv Indicated Determinant if ItAlone Had Changed
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transferred from one holder to another. The widespread attemptc to
liquidate simply reduced prices to a level at which intended purchases
matched intended sales.
Loans on securities, especially call loans, are a somewhat more com-
plex affair. In large measure, what is involvedisalso a transfer of
debts from one lender to another, rather than a change in total. But,
irs addition, the total can be altered much more rapidly. Aside from de-
fault, one way is by a transfer of other assets, as most directly when a
borrower transfers money to a creditor and reduces his own money bal-
ance, or more indirecti when a borrower acquires cashby selling the secu-
rity serving as collateral to someone else who draws down a money bal-
ance to acquire it. Another way is by what is in effect mutualcancellation
of reciprocal debts. The most obvious but clearly insignificant example in-
volves the cancellation by two borrowers of loans they have made to one
another.less obvious but mote important example involves a longer
chain, say, a corporation lending on call in the stock market and simul-
taneously borrowing from a bank. If the bank talres over the call loan in
discharge of its loan to he corporation. the total of the two kinds of debt
outstanding is reduced. The total can also be altered by creation of debts;
for example, if a corporation lending on call in the market is willing to
accept a note from a bank ormore realisticallya depositin that bank
in return for the corporation's claim. In that case, the total of the two
kinds of debt is increased.
The essential point for our purpose is that the demand for liquida-
tion of security loans involves one of three arrangements: (I)finding
someone willing to take over the loans which, asfor securities, can be
done by a change of price, that is. a rise irs interest rates;(2) finding
someone willing to acquire assets for money tobe used by the borrower to
repay his loan, which can be done bylowering the price of the assess; or
(3) arranging for more or less roundabout mutual cancellation or crea-
tion of debts, which involves changes in the relative pricesof the various
assets. The pressure on interest rates and onsecurity prices can be
eased by any measure that enhances the supply of funds in oneof these
forms to facilitate the liquidation of loans in one of these ways.
The situation was eased greatly at the time of the stockmarket crash
by the willingness of New York banks to take overthe loans. Tn the first
week after the crash, those banks increased theirloans to brokers and
dealers by SI billion and the rest of their loansb' $300 million." In
large measure, this involved a creation of debts.The former lenders,
the'others" for the accounts of whom she New Yorkbanks had been
making loans, accepted deposits in New Yorkbanks as repaying their
leans, and the New York banks in turm took overthe claims on the bor-
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were for the accourltb of out-of.tosc'nbanks and were matchedby an in- crease in interhank deposits of $510million in New York Cityweekly reporting member banks. Butour money stock estimatesexclude inter- hank deposits.
To be able to expanddeposits, the New Yorkbanks had to he able either to raise the ratioof deposits toreserves or to acquire additional
reserves. The first was impossiblebecause New York bankshad no excess
1'
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reservesIndeed, the ratio of deposits to high-powered reserves was
lower in New York thait in tlir irt of the countrybccauc of the higher
legal reserve requirements imposed on banks incentral reserve cities.
Therefore the increase in deposits in New York relative toc1eposis in
the rCst of the country in October 1929produced a decline in the average
deposit.reserve ratio for the couotry as a whole.Accordingly, the New
York banks had to and did acquire additional reserves, asthe bulge in
high-powered money shows. They did so in the week of thecrash partly
by borrowing from the FederalReserve Bank of New York, which, in
Harrison's words, kept its "discount window wide openand letit he
known that member banks might borrowfreely to establish the reserves
required against the large increase in depositsresulting from the taking
over of loans called byothers;"49 and partly by virtue of the purchase by
the New York Bank of about $160million of government securities. That
purchase was far in excess of the amount theSystem's Open Market In-
vestment Committee had beenauthorized to purchase (or System account.
It was made by the New YorkBank on its own initiative for its own
account without consulting eitherthe Open Market Investment Corn-
roittee or the Board. 'Fhoughsubsequently ratified, it was, as we shall see
in more detail in section 5, below,the occasion for another battle in the
struggle between the Bank and theBoard, which had important effects on
Federal Reserve policy during the rest of thecontraction.
The actions taken by the New YorkReserve Bank were timely and ef-
fective. Despite the stock marketcrash, there were no panic increases in
money market rates such asthose in past market crises, and no indirect
effects on confidence in bankswhich might have arisen if there had been
any sizable defaults on 5ecurityloans. Harrison himself expressed the
view that "it is not at all unlikelythat had we not bought governments
so freely, thussupplementing the reserves built up by largeadditional
discounts, the stock exchange mighthavp had to yield to the tremendous
pressure brought .o near uponit to close on some one of those verybad
i','c last part ofOctober."49 Harrison may have overstated the case
he was, after all, writing in defenseof the actions the New York Bank
had takenbut that is by no meanscertain.
In the month following thecrash, there was a reversal. Deposits
declined, as more laating arrangementsfor the transfer and reduction of
stock market loans replaced the temporaryshift of many of those loans
to New York banks. Thechanges in deposits produced adecline in the
deposit.currency matio. following therise in October, and a decline in
I larriso'. MisetlalIC')LmS, Vol1.letter, dated Nov. 27, 1929, Harrison toall
ov,rnot l)itrinm the weekrmdinOct 30, 1929. dicosinU increa,sed $200million
at all Rrser.e Bankc, ofwhich $130 million wa the increasein New York City
weekly reporting member bank borrowingsfrom time New York Reserve Bank.









the deposit-reser'e ratio milder than thatin October. HiCh-1)OWerCd
money also declined as a result of a reduction in bills discounted and in
the gold stock, generally atttibuted to the withdrawal by foreigners of
funds from the New York money market5° The net effect sas to leave the
stock of money after the crash at a lower level than before. At the end
of November 1929, the stock of money was $1.3 billion, or 3 per cent, less
than it had been at the end of September. By the end of December, most
of the loss had been made up; the stock of money was about $0.5 billion,
or 1 per cent. less than in September.Thes changes were concentrated in
demand deposits. From December 1929 to October 1930, the stock of
money fluctuated around a roughly constant level though with a mild
downward trend. In October 1930, the stock of money was almost the
same as it had beers in November 1929 and nearly 2 per cent below its
level at the end of December 1929.
For the period from August 1929 to October 1930 as a whole, the money
stock dedined by 2.6 per cent. High-powered money alone declined by 5
per cent. However, the deposit-currency ratio rose by about 7 per cent,
enough to offset a minor decline in the deposit-reserve ratioas well as
half the decline in high-powered money. 1October 1930. the deposit-
currency ratio stood at the highest level reached at any time in the 93
years covered by our data, except only for a fractionally higher peak
reached in the month of the stock market crash (see Charts 31and 64,
and Table B-3). As we noted earlier, the publicwas clearly not greatly
concetned at the time about the safety of bank deposits. Butthe high
ratio made the System peculiarly vulnerableto the development of any
such concern, as the following yearswere to demonstrate so tragically.
The decline in hieh-poweredmoney occurred despite an increase of
$210 million in the gold stock and of $470million in the flat of the
monetary authorities. The latter increase reflectedmostly a rise in govern-
ment securities held by the System, i.e., the substitutionof noninterest-
bearing for interest-bearing government debt.Those expansionar' factors
weme more than offset by a decline in Federal Reserveprivate claims of
$1,020 million$ 100 million in billsbought and $920 million in hillsdis-
counted and other claims (see Chart 32B).Ultjmatel' then, it was the
failure of the Reserve System to replacethe decline in discounts byother











































credit outstanding that was responsible for the decline in thestock of
money.
The decline in discounts took place despite sharp reductions in dis-
count ratesas the New York Bank. from 6 per cent to 21per cent
in June 1930 (Chart 29The successive declines in discount rates
the first of which came in November 1929, three months alter the date
set bthe National Bureau as the reference cycle peakthough sharp and
rapid by earlier standards, took place duringa time when there was a
sharp decline in the demand for loans and an increase in the demand for
assets reardcd as safe. Both made for a sharp decline in market interest
rates. Though the discount rate fell absolutely, it probably rose relative to
the relevant market interest rates, namely, those on short-term securities
with essentially zero risk of default. Hence, discounting became less
attractive. Itis perhaps worth noting that thisis not merely a retro-
spective judgment. The New York Reserve Bank favored more rapid re-
ductions in the rate than those made. Harrison said in May 1931 that "if
there had been no Federal Reserve System in October, 1929, money rates
would probably have come down more rapidly titan they had ......In
September 1930, Adolph Miller of the Federal Reserve Board said at a
meeting with all the governors, 'Money is not really cheap nor easy."
In mid-1930, Harold L. Reed, in the second of his two excellent books on
the Federal Reserve System said: 'in the writer's opinion, however,
there was much stronger ground for holding that the rate reductions had
been too gradual and long delayed" than that they had been too rapid.5'
As the near-constancy of the deposit-reserve ratio indicates, there
was no tendency of banks to accumulate excess reserves. It has been con-
tended with respect to later years (particularly during the period after
1934, when large excess reserves accumulated) that increases in high.
powered money, through expansion of Federal Reserve credit or other
means, would simply have been added to bank reserves and would not
have been used to increase the money stock. In other words, a rise in
high-powered money would have been offset by a decline in the deposit-
reserve ratio. We shall argue later that the contention is invalid even for
the later period. It is clearly not relevant to the period from August 1929
to October 1930. During that period, additional reserves would almost
certainly have been put to use promptly. Hence, the decline in the stock
"See sect. 5 below for the New York Bank's position. The quotation from Harri-
son is from Harrison, Notes, Vol.1, May 21,1931; from Miller, Charles S.
Hamlin, Hamlin Papers, Manusctipt Division. Library of Congress. Diary, Vol. 18,
Sept. 25, 1930, p. 86; from Reed,Federal Reserve Policy,1921-1930, New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1930, p. 191. This may not have been Miller's view earlier in the
year. In May, Hanslin reported, "Miller said the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York was obsessed with the idea that easy money would help the business reces-
5100" (Hamlin, Diary, Vol. 17, May 9, 1930, p. 151).
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THE GREAT CONTRACTLON
of money is not only arithmetically attributableto the decline in Federal
Reserve credit outstanding;itis economically a direct result of that
decline.
ONSET OF FIRST aANK!NG CRiSIS, OCTOIIER 1930
The onset of the banking crisis is clearly marked in all threeproximate
determinants but particularly in the deposit ratios (Chart 31From a
peak of 11.5 in October 1930. tile ratio of depositsto curreiicv declined
sharplya decline that was to carry the ratio, with onlyminor intel lup-
(ions along the way, to a low of 4.1 in March 1933. The deposit-reseive
ratio likewise began a decline thatwas to carry it from a level of 12.9 in
October 1930the all-time high was 13.4 in April 1929toa level of 8.4
in March 1933. These declines brought the deposit-currencyratio back to
its level at the turn Otile century and the deposit-reserve ratio to its
level in 1912. They thus wiped out the whole of the muchheralded spread
in the use of deposits and "economy" inreserves achieved under the Re-
serve System.
The decline in the stock ofmoney as a result of the banking crisis
a decline of slightly more than 3 per cent from October 1930to January
1931. or snore than in the preceding fourteenmonthswas clearly a re-
suit o the declines in the two deposit ratios, sincehigh-powered money
rose by 5 per cent. As Charts 32B and 33 show, tile rise of$340 million in
high-powered money, seasonally adjusted,was produced partly by an in-
flow of $84 million of gold52thesource that had always been the
major reliance in pre-Federal Reservecrisespartly by an increase of
$117 million in Federal Reserve creditoutstanding. The increase in
Federal Reserve credit consisted partlyof a rise of $41 million ingovern-
ment securities, the balance of a rise in float.A rise in discounts just
about offset a decline in bills bought.There was a brief spurt of roughly
$200 million in bills discounted in thetwo weeks after the failure of the
Bank of United States, but it doesnot show up in the seasonally adjusted
end-of-month figures plotted in Chart 33.
The risein Federal Reserve creditcertainly helped to offsetsome
of the immediate effects of thebanking crisis. But themovement was
minor in magnitude. Manyan earlier year-end shows rises of comparable
magnitude and, even at its peak inDecember 1930, seasonally adjusted
Federal Reserve creditwas only 84 per cent c-f its level in thesummer of 1929 when the Systemwas seeking to curb speculation. Tileone other
measure taken by the System in reactionto the banking crisis was a re-
The gold inflows reflected partly theHawlev-Smoot Taff Act passed in June 1930, which raised the tariffto the highest level up to that timein U S. history partly toe reduction of U.S. lendingabroad, and the continuanceat a high level of interest and d.i'iidendson investmens abroad and ofwar debt payments; partly the consequence of U.S. deflationon imports and exports. See sect. 4, below.
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ductioti inate D'cetnber 1930 in the New \otkReserveBanks discount
rate to 2 per centto reassure the puhlic.3
The rise in Fedezal Reserve Bank credit was temporary. After Deèens-
ber 1930. discounts declined, bil!s bought were allowed torun off without
replacement, whik government security holdings increased by only a small
fraction of the combined declinen discounts and bills bought. High-
powered money rose in January 1931, only becausea continued gold
inflow offset the decline in Federal Reserve credit. It declined in February
despite continued gold inflow, and rose slightly in March along witha
minor rise in Federal Reserve credit and the gold stock. The decline in
Federal Reserve credit from December 1930 to March 1931was greater
than the gold inflow. In effect, the System was not only sterilizing the
gold inflow, but exerting a contractionary influence greater than the
expansionary influence of the gold inflow.
Despite the reduction in high-powered money in February 1931, the
money stock rose a bit because of a rise in both deposit ratios,a.s the
wave of bank failures died down and confidence in banks was somewhat
restored. As suggested earlier, ii the rises in the deposit ratios had been
reinforced by a vigorous expansion in high-powered money, instead of
being offset by a reduction, the ground gained might have beencon-
solidated and extended.
ONSET OF SECOND BANKING CRISIS, rIsscit 1931
The onset of the second banking crisis is clearly marked in Chart 31 by
the renewed decline in the deposit ratios and the beginning of a decline
in the money stock at the fastest tate so far in the contraction. In the
five months from March to August, to exclude wholly the effects of
Britain's departure from gold in September, the stock of money fell h' 51,4
per cent, or by almost exactly the same percentage as in all the pre-
ceding nineteen months of the contraction. This was at the phenomenal
annual rate of 13 per cent, vet the rate was soon to rise still higher.
As after the first banking crisis, the decline in the stock of money
was entirely a consequence of the fall in the deposit ratios. High-powered
money rose, this time by 4 per cent from March to August. and so offset
nearly half the contractionarv effect of the declining deposit ratios.
There were, however, two differences between the second banking crisis
and the first one some six months earlier.
Governor Harrison wrote, "he had been urged from many quarters to make a
reassuring statement which might aid in quieting the banking situation. Such a
statement was practically lenposaible because to be strong enough to do any good
it would run the riskofbeing contradicted by any small bank failure which might
thereafter occur. The rate rcduction, apart from other reasons, served as a method
ofstating to the public that money was freely available" (Harrison, Open Market,




































This time, the risc in higls-poweird!iluiicy WdSproduced almost
entirely by the continued gold inflow,whereas earlier there had been at
least a temporary increasein Federal Reserve credit, which helped to ab-
sorb some of the initial effectsof tlw crisis.Federal Rcrvc credit
rematned almost perfectly stable, rising slightlyonly in July and August
1931. Despite the unprecedentedliquidation of the commercial bankinu
system, the books of the'lender of last resort' show a decline inbills
discounted from the end of Februaryto the end of ApriL-a period when
the t4sual seasonalniovenient is upwardand a rise from April to theend
of August that made the wholeincrease from February to August less than
th usual seasonal increase:they show irrecu jar increases and decreasesin
bills bought, with the totalat the end of August $75 million higher than
at the end of February, but still belowits level at the turn of theyear: and they show an increaseof $130 nsillion in governmentsecurities pur-
chased, the whole of the increasebeginning late in June. Of this increase,
$50 million was a purely technicalmove rather than a reaction to domestic
financial difflculties:it simply offset other reductionsin credit outstand- ing. The remaining$30 millionrepresented a deliberate,iftimid. move to contribute ease.34
(2) The second crisislasted longer.Its late 1930, therewere signs of improvement aftertwo or three months, On this occasion,as Chart 31 shows, the deposit_currencyratiothe most ser,sitive indicatorof the public's attitude towardbanksriot only contintiedto fall, but fell at an increasing rate. Therewas no sign that the crisis was drawingto an end when Britain's departurefrom gold intensified it.
Aside from the modestopen market purchases in July andAugust. the only other domestic actionof the System relevantto the money stock was
a further reduction in the discountrate of the New Vrk Reserve Bankto I
1per cent in Maybefore thesharp June increase in batikfailures. As we have seen, thereduction did not stimulateborrowing. On a dif. fercnt front, potentiallyof greatconsequence for the domesticnsonev stock, the System participatedin loans to foreign banksas part of an inter- national effort toavert financial catastrophe abroad."
"Federal Reserve Board,Anniuil Report for 1931,PP. 7-8 These fivures are all as of Wednesdays Of the $130millior, of eoveinmentsecurities purchased $80 million was for SYstemaccount and $50 million for theNw York Bankon account (Harrison, Open Market,Vol. It,minuses of June 2? andAug II, t93l. Open Market PolicyConference meetings:MiscellaneousVol1.letter, dated July9.1931, Harrison to Sear;Notes. Vol.1. July16.1911. and VolII, Aug 4. 1931). The latterpurchase was made to offsetthe effeci of the transferof foreign-held balances from theacceptance market to Federal ReserveBanks "During the secondand third quartem of1931. the Federal Re5erVeBank of New York inassociation with other FederalReserve Banks purchasedprime commercialbillswith guaranteedrepaYment in gold from the AustrianNational Bank. the National Bankof Hungary, ihe Reichsbaiskand the Bank of England The credit agreementswith the Federal ReserveBanks at theirsepas-ate masimums
48)St
at BRITAtN'S DF.PAWUI.'RE FROM GOLD,SEPTEMBER1931
In the few nionthafter the departure of Britain from theold standard.
lit, the proximate determinants of the money stock plottedin Chart 31
list tinued the pattern of the preceding five months, but thepattern was even
more emphatic. The stock of money fell still faster: in the five months
fls from August 1931 to January 1932, it tell by 12per centcompared with
en 5 per cent in the preceding five monthsor at the annualrate of 31
tid per cent--compared with 13 per cent. High-powered money againrose,
ui this time by about 44 per cent, and again offset onlypart. and this
in time a smaller part, of the effect of the declines in the depositratios, par-
an ticularly the deposit-currency ratio. The bankswere so hard pressed
ar; to meet the demands of their depositors that, try though they did, they
ir- were able to do little to lower the ratio of their deposit liabilities to their
s, reserves. That had to wait for a more propitious time, which is why the
tic most rapid decline in the deposit-reserve ratio came later when the de-
c1- dine in the deposit-currency ratio had tapered off, and the slowest de-
d. dine came earlier when the deposit-currency ratiowas declining fastest.
As we shall see in later chapters, much of the adjustmenton the part of
the banks did not come until after the end of the business contraction
and the beginning of recovery. The timing relations between changes in
the two deposit ratios during the 1931-32 segment of thecontrac-
at tion repeated the tendencies we have observed in each earlier banking
an Crisis.
The major difference, aside from scale, between the five-month period,
he August 1931January 1932, and the preceding five months is thesource of
as the rise in high-powered money, which does not show up in Chart 31 but
does in Charts 32B and 33. Up to August 1931. high-poweredmoney
had risen chiefly as a result of gold inflows. As noted in section1 above,
the period after Britain's departure from gold saw a sharp outflow,
cv particularlyin September and October 1931, large enough to offset
THE GREAT c0NTRMJrI0N
aggregated about $156 million and were renewed several times. Rerve Bank
holdings of bills payable in foreign currencies increased from$1million at the end
of March to $145 million in August (Federal Reserve Board, Annual Report for
1931, pp. 12-13).
See also Harrison, Miscellaneous, Vol. 1, letter, dated July 9, 1931, Harrison to
McDougal; Open Market, Vol. 11, minutes of meeting, Aug. 11, 1931; and Notes,
Vol. 1. June 1, 15, 22; July 13. 16, 1931Vol. 11, July 28, 30; Aug. 4; Sept. 24.
28, 1931, for discussion of the foreign credits. One of the directors of the New
York Reserve Bank, Charles E. Mitchell was quoted as saying, "In all of these
cases, h was concerned about the soundness of the operation to be undertaken by
the Federal reserve banks which, in their domestic busins, sake as few chances
as possible," and 'the thing which bothered him with regard to these foreign credits
was the risk involved when, at home, the Federal reserve banks take no risks"
(Harrison, Notes,Vol. I,June 22, 1931).
41)0
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the gold inflows during the earlier seements of the contraction. High-
powered morley rose because Federal Reserve credit outstanding rose.
Federal Reserve credit rose priniarilv because of the sharp rise in dis-
counts as banks, having no other recourse open to them, were driven
to borrowing from the Reserve System, despite the unprecedentedlv sharp
rises in discount rates in October 1931. Bills bought increased substan-
tially in September and October, but then \scre allowed to run off so
that, by January 1932, they had fallen below their level at the end of
August 1931. All told, from August 1931 to January 1932. the rise of
$330 million in high-powered money was accounted for by a rise of
$560 million in discounts, $80 million in government securities, $270
million in other assets of the monearv authorities, offset by a decline of
$580 million in the gold stock.
During those five months when high-powered money rose by $330
million, currency held by the public increased by $720 million. The extra
$390 million had to come from bank reserves. Since banks were unwilling
and unable to draw down reserves relative to their deposits,5e the $390
million, amounting to 12 per cent of their total reserves in August 1931,
could be freed for currency use only by a multiple contraction of deposits.
The multiple worked out to roughly 14, so deposits fell by $5,727 million
or by 15 per cent of their level in August 1931. It was the necessity of
reducing deposits by $14 in order to make $1 available for the publicto
hold as currency that made the loss of confidence in banksso cumulative
and so disastrous. Here was the famous multiple expansionprocess of the
banking system in vicious reverse. That phenomenon,too, explains how
seemingly minor measures had such major effects. The provisionof $400
million of additional high-poweredmoney to meet the currency drain
without a decline in bank reserves could have preventeda decline of
nearly $6 billion in deposits.
In discussing the 1907 Crisis,we showed how the rise in deposit
ratios had made the banking systemmore vulnerable to an attempted con-
version of deposits to currency. The situation in 1931was even more ex-
treme. At no time in 1907 did the public holdmore than $6 in deposits
for every $1 it held in currency; in March1931, when the second banking
crisis began, it held over 810 in depositsfor every $1 of currency, an
amount it succeeded in reducing to under $7 by January1932. In 1907.
the banks owned less than $9 in deposits forevery $1 of high-powered
money they held as reserves; in March 1931, they owedmore than $12.
The more extensive use of deposits_-widelyregarded during the twenties
as a sign of the great progress and refinement of theAmerican financial
structureand the higher ratio of depositsto reserves__widely regarded
as a sign of the effectiveness of thenew Reserve System in promoting
N At the end of Jan.1932, their excesi reserves totaled $40 million.
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igh-
'economy" in the use of reservesmade the rnonetarvsystem much more
vulnerable to a widespread loss of confidence in banks. The defenses de- s.
liberately constructed against such an eventuality turnedout in practice
to be far less effective than those that had grown up in the earlier era. .arP When bank failures tapered off in February and March 1932, the stan-
deposit-currency ratio temporarily stopped falling, However, high-powered
d
so
money declined by $160 million in those two months, despite a dwin-
of
dung of gold outflows, mainly as a result of changes in Reserve Bank c of credit: a decline of $280 million in discounts, and a continued decline e of of $50 million in bills bought, while government security holdingsrose _70 by about $180 million, Discounts declined because banks took advantage
te of of the pause in the demands on them to repay some of their borrowings.
They followed that course despite a reduction in the New York Bank's
330 discount rate to 3 per cent in February. The banks took advantage of the
pause also to strengthen their reserve position somewhat, so the deposit-
illing reserve ratio fell slightly from January to March 1932. The result was
S390 that the stock of money continued to decline though at a slower pace.
931, In these two months it fell by another 2 per cent, an annual rate of 13
osits. per cent, which can be described as moderate only by comparison with
jLIILOfl the preceding 31 per cent annual rate of decline.
ty of
ic to BEGINNING OF LARGE-SCALE OPEN MARKET PURCHASES, APR11. 1932
ative The beginning of the purchase of government securities on a large scale
f the by the Federal Reserve System in April 1932, involving purchase of $350
how million during that month (see Chart 33 for seasonally adjusted end-
S400 of-the-month figures), had no immediate effect on the behavior of the
drain stock of money. It declined another 41/2 per cent for another four months,
'ie of or at an annual rate of 14 per cent. The decline then slowed up sharply,
the money stock falling one-half of I per cent in the two months from
'posit July to September 1932, or at the annual rate of 3 per cent. From Sep-
cOn- tember on, it rose mildly until January 1933, when the money stock was
e cx- one-half of1per cent higher than in September 1932, implying an
osits average rate of growth of about I % per cent per year.
king The reason the bond purchases had no greater effect to begin with is
an that they were offset in part by a renewed outflow of gold and the rest was
1907, more than offset by continued declines in the deposit ratios. From April
ered to July 1932, when Reserve System holdings of government securities went
$12. up by roughly $1 billion, the gold stock fell by about half that amount,
nties most of the outflow going to France. At the same time, a renewed flurry
ncia1 of bank failures in June produced a further appreciable decline in the
rded deposit-currency ratio, and the continued efforts of the banks to strengthen
oting their position produced a further decline in the deposit-reserve ratio.
The gold drain ceased in mid-June and was replaced by an inflow.*
//
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Over the rest of the year, the gold stock rose by $600 million, bringing
the gold stock in January 1933 above its level a year earlier. Reserve Ss.
tern bond purchases ceased in August 1932. Discounts and bills bought fell
from July on, so that total Federal Reserve credit outstanding reacheda
peak in that month and fell by $500 million from then to January 1933.
Nonetheless, high-powered money continued to rise at roughly a constant
rate from April 1932 to January 1933 because of the reversal of the gold
flow, plus an increase of $140 million in national bank notes. The latter
increase was due to an amendment attached to the Home Loan Bank Act
of July 1932, which broadened the range of government bonds eligibleas
security for national bank notes.57 Once the deposit-currency ratio reached
its trough in July 1932, the rise in high-poweredmoney plus the rise in
the deposit-currency ratio were enough to offset the continued fall irsthe
deposit-reserve ratio and produce the pattern of change in themoney
stock already described.
The form taken by the improvement in the banking position,recorded
in the deposit-reserve ratio, is worth noting becauseit presaged a de-
velopment that was to he important in thenext few years. Banks began to
accumulate substantial reserves inexcess of legal requirements. Since
the Reserve System regarded the so-called"excess reserves" as a sign of
monetary ease, their accumulation contributed to adoptionof the policy
of keeping total government securitiesat the level reached inearly
August. Excess reserves were interpreted bymarty as a sign of lack of
demand for bank funds, as meaning thatmonetary authorities could make
"credit" available but could notguarantee its use, a position most suc.
cinctly conveyed by the saying, "monetarypo!icy is like a string; you
can pull on it but you can't push on it." Inour view, this interpreta-
tion is wrong. The reserveswere excess only in a strictly legal sense.
The banks had discovered irs thecourse of tso traumatic years that
neither legal reserves nor the presumedavailability of a "lender of lastre-
sort" was of much avail in time oftrouble, and this lesson was shortlyto
be driven home yet again. Littlewonder that the reserves they found it
prudent to hold exceeded substantiallythe reserves they were legallyre-
quired to hold.5B As noted above,their reaction was thesame as in
"The amendment permitteduse for a period of three years of all.govemment bonds bearing interest at 3per cent or less, including future bond issuesduring the period. From August 1929up to July 1932 there was a alight increase.$60 million--in national banknotes in circulationas national banks exercised sense- what more fully their rightto issue on the security of threegovernment bond issues bearing interest at 2per cent, which had the circulation privilege.













































earlier crises, only greater in magnitude inresponse to the greater
severity of the crisis.
THE BANKING PANIC OF1933
The final banking crisis, which terminated in the banking holiday early
in March 1933, was in most essential respects a duplicate of the two pre-
ceding ones but still more drastic. The money stock fell 12 per cent in
the two months from January to March 1933. or at an annual rate of de-
cline of 78 per cent. For reasons we discuss in detail in the next chapter,
our estimates overstate the decline in the stock of money, but hardly any
reasonable allowance for error could cut the rate of decline to less than the
31 per cent rate of decline from August 1931 to January 1932. As in the
earlier crises, high-powered money rose, primarily as a result of a rise
in discounts and a lesser rise in bills bought. Chart 33 shows an appre-
ciablerisein governmentsecurities. This riseisproduced by the
seasonal adjustment. There is no rise in the original figures.Flie early
months of the years before 1933 were generally characterited by a decline
in the Reserve portfolio of government securities in response to the re-
turn flow of currency from circulation usual at that season. In 1933.
there was, of course, a drain of currency rather than a return flow:
government securities were nevertheless reduced in January by $90 mil-
lion, but then raised in February by $70 million, to a level at which they
also stood at the end of March. Seasonal adjustment of the figures con-
verted the decline in Janaary and the modest rise in February to appre-
ciable increases, and raised the original March figure only slightly less.
The banking holiday in March renders allthe money figures non-
comparable with earlier ones, so we consider the change from January to
February alone, as an approximation of the decline up to the bank holi-
day. In that one month the money stock fell 414 per cent, or at an annual
rate of 56 per cent. Currency held by the public rose hover $600 mil-
lion, high-powered money by $535 inillionaimost the same. But even the
remaining $65 million which had to be supplied from bank reserves, plus
the scramble by banks for reserves, produced a decline in deposits of
over $2 billion in that one month, or nearly 714 per cent of the already
shrunken total. This time the multiplier was not 14 but 29.
The major monetary difference between die final banking crisis arid
the earlier ones was that for the lirst time the internal drain in part
clearly took the form of a drain of gold coin and certificates. As Chart
32A shows, the volume of gold coin and certificates had risen mildly in
1930 but then had been constant or declining until the onset of the filial
crisis. In January 1933, the amount of gold coin and gold certificates
outside the Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks was .S420 million less
than at its peak in December 1930, 8310 million less than at its previous
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January peak in 1931. The declinewas apparently in souse measuret1i
result of a deliberate policy on the part of the FederalR-. -one Systemof
adding to its gold reserves by paving out FederalReset-'. e notes instead
of gold certificates where feasible,a rev cisal of the p'licy adopted
during the twenties to keep down theapparent reserve ratio (see Chapter
6, section 4).Though the total of gold coin andgold certific5
declined, the amount of gold coin alone increasedhr nearly $120 million,
from $65 million in April 1931 to $181 millionin December 1932 That
increase may have reflecteda preference for gold coin in theearlier period, though to some extent itmust reflect the growth of all formsof currency as opposed to deposits. But ifit does reflect a preferencefor gold, that preference was not suflicientivwidespread or dramaticto at-
tract much attention, In February and Marchl933, the situationwas en-
tirelv different, as shown by the sharpspurt in gold coin and certificatesin early 1933 in Chart 32A. Fears ofdevaluation were widespreadand the the public's preference for goldwas unmistakable. On February 23.19)3 Harrison toldthe directors of the Ness' VorkReserve Bank, "there
islittlethat foreigners can do to hurt0111goldPoSition, the real danger comes from domesticsources."6°
"Gold certificates in circulationdeclined in all but three monthsin 1931 and l932whthe certificates may have beenpaid out partly because ofa shortage f other forms of currency,as in Feb. and Mar. 1933 before the hankho!id5_ for a net changeof $460million. Although there isno acknowledgme1jin the Annual Report for 1931 arid1932 that such a retirement policywas in effect, it is significant that the FederalReseroe Bulletin (Nov. 1931,p 604) contains the following Comment:
In considering the goldposition of the country, it shouldbe noted alto that them are $l,000,Oi'JO,OpO ofgold certificates in circulation,a large part of which can be retired by the Federalrerve banks by sub5titutingan equivlr arnou of Federal [reserve) notes. Theretirement of gold certificateswould increase the gold holdingsofthe reserve banks, and ofthi5 increase 40per cent would be required as reserves against theadditional Federal reservenotes and 60 per cent would be added to thesystem's excess reserves,
I-Ic went on to say, "Duringthe kit tendays out-payments ofgold coin at this bank, andprobably, at all of the Federalreserve banks have been heavier than in any recent similarperiod. This movementrepresents sonierhing more than the hoarding of currency,which reflects a distrust ofbanks: it reprecenti in addi. (ion a distrust of thecurrency itself and itis inspired be talk ofslt'valuatjnn of the dollar and isiflation of thecurrertcs" (Harrison Notes,Vol III Harrison made effortsto get banks to discouragehoarding H suggested that they refuse to provide facilitiesfor storage of goldand to 3rarstoa's against th collateral of an equialer.tamountofgold. With ropectto the first, he siigcested that banks impose noobstacles to the acquisitionof gold hut makeno offer of ni1e- keeping facilities: withrespect to Slie second, headvised banks to declinea loan to buy gold on the groundthat it was a loan fora Capital purpose He sad. "I saw no occasion for a memberbank, in these timesparticularly when sooars people who needed creditfor businesspurposes could not obtain sitecredit, to make loans to theirCustomers for the Purpose ofbuying gold to hoardIt was nothing but a speculativeloan gamblir,gon our going off the goldstandard" (Conver5atjons Vol. U, Feb.9, 1933). Directpressure had conic full circle